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Abstract 
The current financial crisis has its roots in global imbalances. But global imbalances in turn are caused by long-term 
factors determining international division of labor. Countries that have comparative advantages in manufacturing or 
are rich in natural resources end up with current account surpluses, and countries that have comparative advantages in 
finance end up exporting financial services and running current account deficits. However, a flux of large quantities 
of liquidities into the deficit countries caused asset bubbles and ultimately leads to the crisis. To cure global 
imbalances, structural changes have to happen on both sides of the imbalances, and international organizations should 
play a more active role. 
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The current financial crisis has its roots in global imbalances, but the causes of global imbalances are 
still a myth and its linkage with the crisis unclear. The consensus seems to suggest that the imbalance was 
caused by the deficit countries’ excessive consumption and the surplus countries’ excessive savings. On 
the surface, this sounds like a plausible explanation. And, because it sounds like a plausible explanation, 
both academics and policymakers are quickly gathering together to propose and plan for the “right” cures, 
that is, to increase consumption in the surplus countries and to increase savings in the deficit countries. 
Indeed, some encouraging signs have emerged from the deficit countries, for instance, domestic savings in 
the United States have increased since the crisis broke out. Taking this as evidence for a turning point for 
the United States, the largest deficit country, to shift away from excessive consumption, many people 
begin to doubt whether there is a chance for the export-led growth model of the surplus countries to 
sustain. After all, if Americans do not want to consume too much, where should the surplus countries, 
especially China and Japan, sell their products?  
Unfortunately, America’s rising saving rates may be temporary, and the surplus countries will continue 
on the export-led growth model, regardless whether they like it or not.  
This is because the real cause of global imbalance rests in the basic economics that has shaped the new 
international division labor that started immediately after the Second World War ended but has 
accelerated after the Berlin wall fell. United States and Great Britain were the only two economic giants in 
the free world when the Second World War ended. But Germany and Japan joined quickly by specializing 
in what they were good at, i.e., manufacturing. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Block 
formed another circle of division of labor. The fall of the Berlin wall started a new wave of globalization 
with every country being brought into a unitary world system of division of labor. 
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Even a casual glance of the countries on both sides of the imbalance tells a pattern of this new wave of 
division of labor. On the deficit side, we have United States, Great Britain, and Australia, all of which has 
adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. The surplus side is more diverse, but we can still tell a 
pattern. There are three groups of countries, the old manufacturing giants, namely, Germany and Japan, 
the newly emerged “world factories”, especially China, and oil exporters.  
The Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism strongly favors the financial sector. The Harvard economist 
Andrei Shleifer and his coauthors have found strong evidence that the common law countries --- or the 
Anglo-Saxon countries --- have better developed capital markets than countries with other legal origins. 
Whether legal origins provide the right explanation is still debatable, but it is clear that the United States 
and Great Britain are more dependent on the capital market to raise capital and their banking sectors are 
much more dynamic --- let us not use the word “efficient”, which may carry a bad connotation at this 
juncture --- than in countries like Germany, Japan, and France. In economic jargon, the Anglo-Saxon 
countries have a comparative advantage in finance, and for that reason, they naturally specialize in finance. 
Thus we see “hollowing out” of manufacturing in those countries. An indicator for that is that finance 
contributes to 20% of the American GDP, but manufacturing only contributes 10%.  
The old manufacturing giants, Germany and Japan, continue to have comparative advantages in 
manufacturing, because they have accumulated strong manufacturing capacities in both physical and 
human capital. This has a lot to do with the history they have inherited from the first wave of division of 
labor. At that time, their roles were already cemented in manufacturing goods for the consumption in 
United States. Their current strengths lie in sophisticated consumer products and intermediate inputs. 
The newly emerged manufacturers like China export mainly low-end consumer products. Their 
comparative advantages lie in their relatively cheap but educated labor forces. Joining in the world system 
helps those countries to tap into the potentials of their abundant labor forces. In the case of China, 
accession to the WTO in 2001 has made a big difference. Between 2001 and 2007, China’s exports grew 
by 28% per annum, compared with 15% in the 1990s. Not surprisingly, China’s burgeoning foreign 
exchange reserves also began to build up in that time period. Looking India from the len of China, though, 
often leaves people puzzled. India has similar demographics as China’s, but India’s current account 
registers deficits. However, this may be caused by India’s reluctant embrace of globalization. India has 
more restrictive labor market regulations than China, and Indian intellectuals are more critical on 
globalization than their Chinese counterparts. Indeed, if we trace both countries’ trade dependency ratios -
-- that is, the ratio of trade divided by GDP --- against the years since their respective reforms began, we 
find that India has followed closely China’s trajectory of opening to international trade.  
The oil exporters have traditionally provided oil dollars to the United States. These countries have 
small manufacturing sectors, but their oil income is more than enough for them to import consumer goods. 
What is surprising is that in the last decade Russia has joined the rank of these countries. Being a 
traditionally strong manufacturer has not immunized Russia from being captured by the Dutch disease. Its 
economy has been singularized and its inflation rate has seldom fallen to single digits.  
In summary, this round of globalization has a strong tendency to specialize countries in specific 
economic activities at which individual countries enjoy comparative advantages. Then, why does 
specialization lead to imbalance of payments with some countries having net surpluses and others having 
net deficits? Economic theory predicts that normally a surplus country would enjoy an increase of wealth, 
so it would import more and its current account would end up with being roughly balanced again. 
Economic theory also predicts that normally a deficit country would face high interest rates and would cut 
borrowings and rebalance its current account. But in reality we have observed persistent imbalance on 
both sides. Why? 
It has a lot to do with the pattern of specialization we’ve just seen. It is not a coincidence that none of 
the surplus countries has a highly developed financial market. They specialize either in manufacturing or 
in oil exporting. No wonder the “manufacturing” of finance is concentrated in New York and London. 
Like other activities, finance also finds its way to concentrate in places where it is done in the most 
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efficient way. As a result, hard-earned money flows from the surplus countries to the deficit countries. 
That is, the financial markets in the surplus countries are incapable to channel savings earned on exports 
to domestic investment or consumption. This observation has an ironic implication for the current debate 
which often lays blames on the American financial market for causing the financial crisis. While the 
American financial market may be too fluid, the financial markets in the surplus countries are too static. 
This shows how the imbalance comes into place. However, if the financial markets in the deficit 
countries, particularly the United States and the Great Britain, could properly digest the “excessive” 
supply of money from the surplus countries, then imbalance would not have mattered. It would have even 
disappeared. In a frictionless world, i.e., a world free of cross-border restrictions and endowed with strong 
legal protections and able actors who have all the relevant information to make the right decisions, we 
should have seen that banks in Wall Street open subsidiaries in Germany, Japan, China, and Russia, so 
those countries do not need to export their hard-earned surpluses. Of course, the world is full of frictions 
so we end up with the imbalance. However, imbalance did not necessarily lead to the financial crisis. If 
the American financial market had not been overly concentrated in the housing and commodity markets, 
there would have been no asset bubbles and there would have been no crisis. There seem to be numerous 
opportunities for high-return investments in other parts of the world. For example, investing in 
infrastructure in Africa and India should be profitable in view of the low quality of infrastructure over 
there. Unfortunately, the financial sector is the most sensitive industry in terms of demands for legal 
protection and information so, surprisingly, it is the most home-biased industry despite its fluidity. 
Bankers prefer doing their businesses at their home countries where they feel easy with the legal system. 
It is not an accident that the deficit countries have the best legal framework for financial market 
development. As a result, money flows there and mostly stays there. Unfortunately --  again, unfortunately 
-- there are not that many new technologies or other productive activities to invest in those countries. In 
the end, their financial sectors flourish on creating its own “productive” assets, which are basically assets 
on paper accumulated on derivatives and other sorts of financial innovations. So the bubbles. 
The crisis seems to have reached its bottom and there seem to be lights at the end of the tunnel 
signaling for a recovery. However, there will be no corrections for the imbalance even if the world 
economy recovers. We will quickly go back to business as usual. The proposals currently put on the table 
are not going to offer the cure. 
Many people point figures on the inflexible exchange rate regimes in some surplus countries, 
particularly China. However, Germany and Japan both have a floating regime, but both countries run very 
large surpluses. In particular, Japan has remained a strong exporter despite the Plaza Accord forced the 
Yen to float and revaluate. China’s own experience since 2005 also rejects the claim. Between 2005 and 
2008, RMB appreciated by about 20%, but China’s trade and current account surpluses both surged. 
The proposal for the surplus countries to increase consumption will not work either. Most of the 
growth of savings in the surplus countries has been contributed by corporate profits and government 
revenues although residential saving rates remain high there. The problem is not so much of a lack of 
residential consumption than of a lack of corporate investment and government spending. The Chinese 
government is being urged to spend more on social security and health care. While this will have a direct 
effect on government spending, the Chinese government has to be careful not to over-commit itself to 
social security and health care. Public money becomes cheap at a time of fast economic growth and thus 
fast growth of government revenues, which often leads governments to over-commit in public spending. 
Japan and the United States are two examples. In addition, the induced residential consumption should not 
be exaggerated. Both Germany and Japan have good social security and health care systems, but 
residential consumption in both countries is still relatively low, especially when it is compared with other 
industrialized countries.  
If the adjustments in the surplus countries are unlikely to happen or at least take time to happen, we 
cannot expect that the adjustments in the deficit countries happen quickly either. Money is still going to be 
cheap and borrowing is still optimal to finance consumption. 
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In the end, economics wins the game. Unless we reject free trade and free flow of capital and the 
division of labor associated with them, we will have to live with global imbalance for quite a long time. 
The problem facing us is not to correct the imbalance, but how to neutralize its negative consequences. To 
do that, we have to realize that either side of the imbalance is incapable finishing the business on its own. 
We have to find a global solution. 
The solution is to create non-country-specific financial assets and make them sufficiently profitable for 
the surplus countries to invest in. The IMF’s SDR can be such an asset. Most of the world is still very 
poor and desperately needs investment. If the arrangement is right, this investment can be profitable and 
the surplus countries will be willing to contribute. In this respect, the IMF can work with the World Bank 
to enlarge and strengthen both institutions’ current operations to accommodate more contributions from 
the surplus countries. This round of IMF’s capitalization is a good start and should be continued. The 
specifics, of course, need to be worked by financial specialists. The bottom line, however, is that this is a 
doable way to neutralize the negative effects of global imbalances. 
